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A Dilemma for Dogmatism 
Adrian Haddock, University of Stirling 
I want to consider something in the background of “Merits of Incoherence”. 
In “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist”, Pryor writes: “when it perceptually seems to you 
as if P is the case, then you have a kind of justification for believing that P, that does not 
presuppose or rest on your justification for anything else.”  It is tempting to understand this 
formulation as specifying a condition that the subject who believes that P could express by 
saying “It perceptually seems to me as if P”, and could appeal to in order to justify believing 
that P.  The problem is that this condition is not something that the subject can intelligibly 
take to justify believing that P; as he could put it: “It is consistent with what I have to go on 
that P is not so—so how can it possibly justify believing that it is so?”  Dogmatism, 
understood as the claim that such a condition can be intelligibly taken by the subject to justify 
believing that P, is false.  To avoid this, it is tempting to understand the formulation as instead 
specifying a condition that a theorist could express by saying “It perceptually seems to the 
subject as if P”, and could appeal to in order to render the subject’s belief rationally 
intelligible.  It belongs to the earlier condition that the only one who could express it is the 
subject—it is an aspect of his self-consciousness.  But this does not belong to the present 
condition.  Dogmatism, understood as the claim that such a condition can be intelligibly taken 
by a theorist to render the subject’s belief rationally intelligible, avoids falsity—but only by 
not engaging with skepticism.  This is because skepticism is a difficulty that arises for the 
subject when he reflects on what is in the scope of his self-consciousness—on (as he could 
put it) “what I have to go on”—and asks whether this justifies believing that P.  Epistemology 
is engaging with this difficulty only insofar as it is seeking to specify what is in this scope.   
So, there is a dilemma for dogmatism: either it is specifying an aspect of the subject’s 
self-consciousness—in which case it is false; or it is specifying an aspect of a theorist’s 
consciousness—in which case it is not engaging with skepticism.     
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